Did You Really Get A Loan

Did You Really Get A Loan

Did You Really get A Loan

Did you really get a loan when you contracted to borrow money from the bank to pay for your home? Or was it just an exchange (your note for cash), but the bank called it a loan? Or did two loans occur?

The banker says, repay the loan because the bank lent you money. We simply ask one question: Should the one who funded the loan be repaid the money? Whether they answer YES or NO, the bank must forgive the loan and zero out the debt. That is the one question that they do not want to answer because the borrower funded the loan as proven by the bank's own bookkeeping entries.

Before an attorney can sue for foreclosure, he must show that the defending party (you) breached the agreement. The attorney needs a witness to give testimony that there is an agreement and that the agreement has been breached.

If Rich (as an example) testifies in court that there was a loan when he knew that there was only an exchange of equal value, Rich would be giving false testimony and would be called a false witness.

In a normal court foreclosure, the lender does not come to court to give testimony. The bank attorney uses the alleged promissory note with the alleged borrower's signature as the witness in court to claim that there is an agreement, that there was a loan, that the lender fulfilled his agreement, and that the alleged borrower did not fulfill the agreement to repay the money. Instead of the attorney using Rich to give oral testimony, the attorney used the promissory note as the witness as the evidence to sue the alleged borrower.

There is a legal concept of form vs. substance. The form is the promissory note, which says that the lender lent money to the alleged borrower. The substance is the money trail - the bookkeeping entries. The substance shows that there were two loans exchanged - equal value for equal value. The borrower was required to repay his loan to the bank plus interest, but the bank never repaid the debt it owes to you. IOU was exchanged for IOU. The two newly created IOUs cancel each other.

Acts in reference to the issue of whether "greenbacks" could be used to pay state taxes. In Perry v. Washburn, 20 Cal.318 (1862), the California Supreme Court ruled that United States notes could not be used to pay state taxes, especially where a California statute required taxes to be paid in coin. In State Treasurer v. Collector Sangamon County, 28 Ill. 509, 512 (1862)

The Colorado Constitution Page 12 states only coin can be used to pay debts.

§10. Powers denied individual states. (1) No state shall enter into

any treaty, alliance or confederation; grant letters of marque or reprisal;

coin money; emit bills of credit; make anything but gold and silver coin a

tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or

law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of nobility.

In reference to the lawfulness of the "greenback" currency of the Union, this issue involved not one single case but a multiple of cases spanning some 15 years. Before delivering any opinion wherein a challenge to the constitutionality of the Legal Tender Acts was concerned, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered certain opinions in cases related to this issue. In Bronson v. Rodes, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 229 (1869), the Court held that a bond requiring payment in specie coin could not be discharged by paying "greenbacks":

In the case immediately following Bronson, supra, the Court, in Butler v. Horowitz, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 258 (1869), held the same way in reference to a contract requiring payment in specie. In New York v. Supervisors, County of New York, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 26 (1869), the Court held that legal tender Treasury notes were exempt from state taxation.

By 1870, some 8 years after the adoption of the first Legal Tender Act in 1862, the Court was finally required to pass upon the constitutionality of those acts. As noted above, the Kentucky Supreme Court had held these acts to be unconstitutional in Griswold v. Hepburn, supra, and it was to this case that the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The chief architect of the Legal Tender Acts had been Treasury Secretary Chase, who by now was sitting on the Court as its Chief Justice, and it was Chase who wrote the majority opinion in Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603, 625 (1870). The issue in this case involved whether legal tender notes could be used to discharge a debt contracted before the passage of the first legal tender act, and this determination necessarily involved the constitutionality of those Congressional acts. Chase noted in the opinion that the legislation adopted by Congress making Treasury notes a legal tender occurred at the height of troubling times and that the motive for the acts was patriotic in nature; this was obviously stated because of his own personal involvement in obtaining passage of the acts. Nonetheless, and notwithstanding personal motives and convictions which certainly played a part in passage of this legislation, it was time to test the conformity of the acts with the U.S. Constitution. Chase analyzed the specific provisions of the Constitution which granted Congress various powers, and determined there was no express grant to declare Treasury notes a legal tender. There being no such express grant, he then examined specific Congressional powers to determine if any implied power would sustain the acts. He examined the power to coin money, to borrow, to regulate commerce and to declare war, but there he found no method for developing an implied power, which would uphold the acts. He examined the spirit of the Constitution as well as certain prohibitions contained therein, none of which could be useful in supporting an implied power. Finding no support for the constitutionality of the challenged acts, he found them unconstitutional:

Quote

"We are obliged to conclude that an Act making mere promises to pay dollars a legal tender in payment of debts previously contracted, is not a means appropriate, plainly adapted, really calculated to carry into effect any express power vested in Congress; that such an Act is inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution; and that it is prohibited by the Constitution."

The above quote would also apply to the use on paper money being in direct opposition to the Constitutions of the States and the United States to pay a debt in anything other than coin.

Hagar v. Reclamation District No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 706 (1884), decided only 2 months after Juilliard. In Hagar, one issue involved the type of currency to be used to discharge a liability for state taxes. In holding that such taxes had to be paid in specie coin pursuant to state law, Justice Field relied upon Lane County and stated:

"The extent to which the power of taxation of the state should be exercised, the subjects upon which it should be exercised, and the mode in which it should be exercised, were all equally within the discretion of its legislature, except as restrained by its own constitution and that of the United States."

At present, there are no federal taxes that are apportioned among the states, as is required of direct taxes.

An additional point of consideration arises from the fact that neither Knox or Juilliard sanctioned an irredeemable currency. The court in Knox expressly held that representatives of federal liability, Treasury notes, were to be taken as the equal of coin, with the understanding that these notes would eventually be paid. Redemption began in 1879, and at the time of the Juilliard decision, such notes were convertible into specie coin. The Court has never sanctioned the complete suspension of specie payment, as was plainly demonstrated in Ward v. Smith, 74 U.S. 447 (1869):

"Notes not thus current at their par value, nor redeemable on presentation, are not a good tender to principal or agent, whether they are objected to at the time or not," 74 U.S., at 451-52.

Therefore, a federal currency which is not redeemable in specie coin is repugnant to the Constitution.

To thoroughly get the term 'excise' straight, let's let some lower federal courts clarify the term excise for us also:

American Airways v. Wallace 57 F.2d 877, 880 "The terms "excise tax" and "privilege tax" are synonymous. The two are often used interchangeably."

Manufacturers' Trust Co. v. U.S. 32 F. Supp 289 "A tax levied upon property, because of its ownership, is a direct tax, whereas one levied upon property because of its use is an excise, duty or impost."

From the legal encyclopedia American Jurisprudence Chapter 71 State and Local Taxation, Section 28, we read, "The obligation to pay an excise is based upon the voluntary action of the person taxed in performing the act, enjoying the privilege, or engaging in the occupation which is the subject of the excise, and the element of absolute and unavoidable demand is lacking."

You can avoid an excise tax by avoiding or not participating in the activity or privilege that is the subject of the tax. Since the income tax has been ruled to be an excise tax, then the same principle would apply. If you do not engage in the privileged (licensed) taxable activity or occupation, then you will not be subject to the tax. It is voluntary!

Again, from American Jurisprudence (Am. Jur.) Chapter 71 Section 94, we read "The (inalienable) right to acquire, possess, or own property cannot, according to one doctrine, be made the subject of an excise tax. The theory appears to be that a tax upon the right to acquire, possess, hold or own property is tantamount to a tax upon the property itself, and hence, must be regarded as a property tax and not an excise tax."

71 Am. Jur. 194 says "A tax on an essential attribute of a thing is a tax on the thing itself, and no tax can be imposed on the right of ownership, which is not also a tax on property. An individual, unlike a corporation, cannot be taxed for the mere privilege of existing, nor for the enjoyment of the right to own property."

By June 1, 1933, a Congressional Joint Resolution, number 192, was proposed to make it against public policy to pay any obligation in gold. It was during the debate on this resolution that the fact was made known that the Federal Reserve Banks possessed virtually all the federal gold clause bonds to mature within the next 6 months.[12] This resolution was enacted on June 5, 1933, and notwithstanding the fact that it was only a joint resolution, it was accorded the force of law.

Now it is illegal to pay for anything in gold, so where does that leave us when it comes to paying for something like taxes that are only payable in gold coins as declared in the state and federal Constitution's, if one wishes to pay a voluntary property tax on ones private property?

"The Legal Tender Acts do not attempt to make paper a standard of value. We do not rest their validity upon the assertion that their omission is coinage, or any regulation of the value of money; nor do we assert that Congress may make anything, which has no value money. What we do assert is that Congress has power to enact that the government's promises to pay money shall be for the time being equivalent in value to the representative of value determined by the coinage acts or to multiplies thereof. It is hardly correct to speak of a standard of value ... It is, then, a mistake to regard the Legal Tender Acts as either fixing a standard of value or regulating money values, or making that money which has no intrinsic value," 79 U.S., at 553.

Dissenting from the decision in Knox were Chief Justice Chase, and Justices Clifford and Field, who rose to the occasion and set forth innumerable law, facts and arguments against the acts.

The decision in Knox resolved the issue of the constitutionality of federal "bills of credit" during war, but it was still an open question as to their use in times of peace. In 1875, Congress enacted the Specie Resumption Act, which became effective in 1879. In 1878, Congress passed additional legislation permitting the reissuance of Treasury notes after redemption. By 1884, the Supreme Court was confronted with the issue of whether legal tender Treasury notes could be reissued in peacetime. In Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 448 (1884), the Supreme Court expanded the Knox doctrine to allow peacetime issuance of legal tender Treasury notes:

"Congress is authorized to establish a national currency, either in coin or in paper, and to make that currency lawful money for all purposes, as regards the national government or private individuals."

In writing this opinion, Justice Gray successfully located the origin of this power in the express grant to Congress to "borrow money;" this was apparent notwithstanding the fact that the microscopic examination of the Constitution by Justice Strong in Knox failed to reveal the source of this hidden power. As justification for this holding, Justice Gray relied upon the sovereign powers of European governments, something which was totally new to construction of the American Constitution.

The dissents in both Knox and Juilliard were exceptionally well written and documented rebuttals of the erroneous findings of historical fact relied upon by the majority in both cases. Justice Field aptly stated the case of the dissenters by noting that no jurist or statesman in our country, prior to the Civil War, ever mentioned or alluded to the power so readily found by the majority in both Knox and Juilliard; "All conceded, as an axiom of constitutional law, that the power did not exist," 110 U.S., at 454. The defects in findings of historical fact, argument and reasoning in both cases were ably pointed out by George Bancroft in his work, A Plea for the Constitution, written in direct response to the Juilliard decision. If Bancroft did not fully destroy the fallacies of Juilliard, Dr. Edwin Vieira in his book, Pieces of Eight, has conclusively done so.

It is not the capable works as above described which have limited the scope of the Legal Tender Cases; instead, it is the decisions of the same Court which rendered both Knox and Juilliard that define the limits of the legal tender powers of Congress. A full two years before the Supreme Court decided Hepburn and three years before Knox, the Supreme Court determined a limitation on federal "bills of credit" in the case of Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 77 (1868). The rationale found in both Perry v. Washburn, supra, and in State Treasurer v. Collector, supra, was followed in Lane County, and the Court there held that a state law requiring taxes to be paid in specie coin could not be circumvented by payment in "greenbacks," reasoning:

"There is nothing in the Constitution which contemplates or authorizes any direct abridgement of this power by national legislation."

Lane County was rendered by the same Court which rendered Hepburn and the majority of which decided Knox. And a similar case was rendered after Juilliard, that case being Hagar v. Reclamation District No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 706 (1884), decided only 2 months after Juilliard. In Hagar, one issue involved the type of currency to be used to discharge a liability for state taxes. In holding that such taxes had to be paid in specie coin pursuant to state law, Justice Field relied upon Lane County and stated:

It appears that the conveyance of Congressional Juilliard powers to these banks was an outright gift to a very powerful, self interested financial group, subject to no control or restraint by Congress. The Federal Reserve System was given unbridled power to expand or contract the number and amount of outstanding federal "bills of credit." This legislation is unconstitutional for this reason.

On August 28, 1933, Roosevelt issued an Executive Order, which required information returns for gold ownership and prohibited possession of gold except by license. Roosevelt in his war upon gold ownership by American citizens was the Gold Reserve Act of January 30, 1934, 48 Stat. 337. Failure to file the required returns and possession of gold without license were made criminal offenses.

This above quote means that the gold wedding bands worn on the right hand of most American people is illegal to own. What an interesting law that is.

We the people want to know why Congress has forced us to borrow our own money into circulation at interest with United States bonded indebtedness? We believe, as did President Lincoln, that if a nation can issue a $5 bond, it can issue a $5 bill.

We the people gave no authority to the Federal Reserve Bank to coin or create the nations money. We delegated that power to Congress.

Even if Congress should feel incompetent to manage the nation's money, it has no power to delegate nor to relinquish that authority.

Barter is the system of exchange whereby property is directly exchanged for other and different property. No one can be damaged by barter. Specie coin is an improvement of barter exchange; here exchange occurs via a common form of property, gold or silver, and property and wealth are exchanged for property and wealth. Trade and commerce achieved through the use of specie coin is similar to barter and nobody gets damaged thereby. However, to prostitute the specie coin exchange by replacing it with something of worthless value results in wealth and property being exchanged for nothing of value. This is nothing more nor less than theft. Our nation is nothing more than a society of thieves and we steal each other's wealth, property and labor with something that is inherently worthless.

However, while citizens of this nation unknowingly steal one from another, the creators of these monetary instruments are the greatest of thieves. The Federal Reserve Banks and all the private commercial banks of this nation are the creators of Federal Reserve Notes and bank demand deposits. These institutions obtain whatever real resources, wealth and labor they need or desire merely by printing on paper and issuing credit. These institutions truly acquire everything they need or desire, such as bank buildings, employee labor, farmlands or factories, for nothing but the cost of printing.

Another serious defect of our currency system consists of the fact that the supply of this purported currency can be manipulated at will by the Federal Reserve System. By purchasing government bonds, the Federal Open Market Committee can expand the credit supply; by selling bonds, it can contract that supply. By the Federal Reserve Board decreasing bank reserve requirements, private banks can increase deposits; the inverse works for an increase in the reserve requirement ratio. The American people have absolutely no control over the volume of currency and credit in circulation. When the currency supply is deliberately and intentionally decreased by this manipulation, innocent victims are created who cannot repay loans; this results in loss of property through foreclosure.

Banks simply extend credit when loans are made. The "currency" for which these and all others loans in America can be redeemed is known as the Federal Reserve Note ("FRN").

The reserves held by Federal Reserve Banks have been admitted by the government in its work titled A Primer on Money to be "backed" by nothing:

Banks are prohibited by law from loaning their credit; see Citizens' Nat. Bank of Cameron v. Good Roads Gravel Co., 236 S.W. 153, 161 (Texas App. 1922); National Bank of Commerce of Kansas City v. Atkinson, 55 F. 465, 471 (D.Kan. 1893); Bowen v. Needles Nat. Bank, 94 F. 925, 927 (9th Cir. 1899); Merchants' Bank of Valdosta v. Baird, 160 F. 642, 645 (8th Cir. 1908); First Nat. Bank of Tallapoosa v. Monroe, 69 S.E. 1123, 1124 (Ga. 1911); American Express Co. v. Citizens' State Bank, 194 N.W. 427, 429 (Wis. 1923); Howard & Foster Co. v. Citizens' Nat. Bank of Union, 130 S.E. 758, 759 (S.C. 1925); Farmers' & Miners' Bank v. Bluefield Nat. Bank, 11 F.2d 83, 85 (4th Cir. 1926); Best v. State Bank of Bruce, 221 N.W. 379, 380 (Wis. 1928); Norton Grocery Co. v. People's Nat. Bank of Abingdon, 144 S.E. 501, 503 (Va.App. 1928); Federal Intermediate Credit Bank v. L'Herisson, 33 F.2d 841 (8th Cir. 1929); First Nat. Bank of Amarillo v. Slaton Ind. School Dist., 58 S.W.2d 870, 875 (Texas App. 1933); and Ferguson v. Five Points National Bank of Miami, 187 So.2d 45, 47 (Fla. App. 1966).

Thomas Jefferson once said: "If the American people ever allow private banks to control the issue of their money, first by inflation and then by deflation, the banks and corporations that will grow up around them will deprive the people of their property until their children will wake up homeless on the continent their fathers conquered."

We the people want to know why Congress has forced us to borrow our own money into circulation at interest with United States bonded indebtedness? We believe as did President Lincoln, that if a nation can issue a $5 bond, it can issue a $5 bill.

We the people gave no authority to the Federal Reserve Bank to coin or create the nations money. We delegated that power to Congress.

Even if Congress should feel incompetent to manage the nation's money, it has no power to delegate nor to relinquish that authority.

The Supreme Court has held some of the powers of Congress to be delegatable, but no power strictly legislative in nature Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 US 388, 79 L.Ed. 446. Even where the power was held to be delegatable, Congress was required to lay a policy and to set up a standard. Avent v. U.S., 266 US 127; Central Securities Corp. v. U.S., 287 US 12; U.S. v. Chemical Foundations Inc., 271 US 1.

In the statute creating the Federal Reserve System, and in its subsequent amendments, there appears no stated limitation on the powers and authority of this corporation.

The "Federal Reserve Act" is without authority; Congress has made an unlawful delegation of power strictly legislative ...

"Delegation by Congress of its essential legislative functions is precluded by the provisions of the Federal Constitution. Article I, Section 1, that all legislative powers granted to the Federal Government shall be vested in Congress and of Article I, Section 8, Clause 13, empowering Congress to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution its general power."

Panama Ref. Co., supra. at 388;

Union Bridge Co. v. U.S., supra.;

Wayman v. Southland,

10 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 6 L.Ed. 253;

Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S.,

295 US 495, 79 L.Ed. 1570;

Knickerbocker Inc. Co. v. Stewart,

253 US 149, 64 L.Ed. 834

It must be understood that the "Federal Reserve Note" is not United States money, as defined by our Constitution, although it might be implied by the legal tender at 31 USC 392:

Could a piece of paper then represent a foot? This is a relatively simple question; of course a piece of paper could represent a foot by being 12 inches long. ... The same holds true with all units of measure; the pound is merely represented by 16 ounces, but 16 ounces merely represent that pound just as a piece of paper might represent a pound by weighing 16 ounces ...

What is a "Dollar?" A dollar, like the foot and pound, backs a "standard of value." Congress has said that the standard unit of value for the dollar is to be gold, 15 5/21 grains 9/10 fine by weight, and that this gold at this weight is to represent the dollar, and further that the dollar of gold, shall be the standard unit of value by which all coins and currencies are to be maintained (31 USC 314).

As early as the second Congress, it was established that the proportional value of silver to the gold dollar of 15 5/21 grains of gold 9/10 fine.

We know that the "Federal Reserve Note" does not represent either gold or silver. There were 67 billion of dollars in bills as of June 1973 circulating in the form of these "Notes" and at that time there was only 10 billion Dollars in gold within the continental United States.

The "Federal Reserve Note" represents no standard of value and is incapable of representing the dollar. This lack of value is fatal to its character and the intention of Congress.

What then are "Federal Reserve Notes", if they are not "Dollars?"

Was the purpose and effect of the "Federal Reserve Act" to authorize a new kind of money?

Did the government and the Federal Reserve bank really and in fact contract by these "Notes" to pay the bearer on demand, or at any time?

Are these "Notes" really promises to make other promises?

"Federal Reserve Notes" are in many respects similar to the "United States Notes"; they are both paper; they are both "Notes", and they both circulate on the credit of the United States. ...

"United States notes are engagements to pay dollars and the dollars intended were the coined dollars of the United States."

Bank of New York v. N.Y. County,

7 Wall. (U.S.) 26

"Their name imports obligation, everyone of them expresses upon its face an engagement of the nation to pay to the bearer a certain sum, the dollar note is an engagement to pay a dollar, and the dollar intended is the coined dollar of the United States, a certain quantity in weight and fineness of gold or silver ... no other dollars had before been recognized by the legislature of the national government as lawful money."

Bank of New York, supra., at 30

In "Knox v. Lee" the majority opinion was written by Justice Strong:

"We will notice briefly an argument presented in support of the position that the unit of money value must possess intrinsic value. The argument is derived from assimilating the Constitutional provision respecting a standard of weights and measures to conferring, the power to coin money and regulate its value, it is said there can be no uniform standard of weights without weight, or measure without length or space and we are asked how anything can be made a uniform standard of value which has itself no value? This is a question of value. We do not rest their validity upon the assertion of the value of money, nor do assert that Congress may make anything which has no value, money. What we do assert is that Congress has power to enact that the governments promises to pay money shall be for the time being equivalent in value to the representative of value determined by the coinage acts."

Knox v. Lee,

12 Wall 552, 553

In March 1968, the government repudiated its promise to pay money and according to what Justice Strong implied if there were no promise there could be no value, the value was derived from the promise of the government and nothing else...

The only money that may lawfully circulate within the United States is gold and silver coin; this is the only money Congress may legally issue and it is the only money to be honored by the courts. The legal tender "Notes" have been the representative of the values and have circulated by general consent as the equivalent to money; but not as money by any legal standard.

Money, says Sir William Blackstone, is:

"A universal medium, or common standard, by comparison with which the value of all merchandise may be ascertained, or it is a sign, which represents the respective values of all commodities, metals are well calculated for this sign, because they are durable and are capable of many subdivisions; and a precious metal is still better calculated for this purpose, because it is the most portable. A metal is also the most proper for a common measure, because it can easily be reduced to the same standard in all nations; and every particular nation fixes on its own impression that the weight and standard (wherein exist the intrinsic value) may both be known by inspection only."

Commentaries on the Laws of England,

1 Blackstone, Sec. 387

"The power to coin money is one of the ordinary prerogatives of sovereignty, and is almost universally exercised in order to preserve a proper circulation of good coin of a known value in the home markets, in order to secure it from debasements, it is necessary, that it should be exclusively under the control and regulation of the government."

3 Story 16

"Bank Notes" and all "Paper Notes" are treated as money only so long as they remain current at par and in lieu of coin; but no paper, in a strictly legal sense, could be money as money, strictly applied, is coined metal. There is a necessary distinction between paper being treated as money and paper actually being money. There is a possibility of the former but there is no possibility of the latter. "Bills of credit" and "negotiable tax receipts" were actually the forerunners of the legal tender "United States Notes," "Treasury Notes," and all other legal tender paper. The sole distinction is that "Bank Notes" are guaranteed by the bank of issue; whereas, the "Legal Tender Notes" are ultimately guaranteed by the government. The laws, necessarily relevant to "Bank Notes," must apply with like force to "Notes" guaranteed and ultimately pledged to be redeemed by the government.

"Even prior to 1844, it was held that an action of debt would not lie upon a note to pay a sum certain in current bank notes."

Young v. Scott, 5 Ala. 475

"The reasoning which led to the conclusion attained in the above case, was, that bank notes were not money, although they might profess to be its representative."

Carlisle v. Davis, 7 Ala. 42

"The term "Bank Notes" as employed here import in their ordinary acceptance such bank bills only as are redeemable in gold or silver, or such as are equivalent thereto."

Flemming v. Nall,

1 Tex. 246;

Pierson v. Wallace,

7 Ark. 282

There are numerous cases where a designation of the payment of such instruments in "Notes" of particular banks, associations or in paper not current as money; have been held to destroy their negotiability (Irvine v. Laury, 14 Pet. 295; Miller v. Austin, 13 How. 218, 228; Ontario Bank v. Lightbody, 3 Wend. 101).

"In the use of the term, currency, includes only such bank notes as are current, that is, bank notes which are issued for circulation by authority of law, and are in actual and general circulation at par with coin, as a substitute for coin, interchangeable with coin; bank notes which actually represent dollars and cents, and are paid and received for dollars and cents at their legal standard value, whatever is at a discount, that is whatever represents less than the standard value of coined dollars and cents, at par does not properly represent dollars and cents, and is not money."

Leeger v. Goodrich,

5 Cw. 187;

Pierson v. Wallace,

7 Ark. 293;

Ontario Bank v. Lightbody, Supra.;

Klauber v. Biggerstaff,

47 Wis. 561

"Federal Reserve Notes" are so hopelessly depreciated that Congress has given up any attempt at redemption. Twice in fourteen months they have depreciated some 18% in the foreign markets and Congress, here at home, has offered standard silver dollars for sale at a ratio of $30 dollars in "Federal Reserve Notes" for $1 in standard lawful money (See General Service Administration, Form T-588-R [12-72] - and like offers over the years).

Thus Congress has established that there is a ratio of value somewhere exceeding 30 to 1. That "Act" necessarily raises another question; namely. if all coins and currencies, regardless of when coined or issued shall be a legal tender (31 USC 392); what is Congress doing when it sells one "legal tender" for thirty dollars ($30.00) in another "legal tender" ("Federal Reserve Notes")? Is it not depreciating the dollar "Federal Reserve Note" tender and declaring that there is a difference in the measure of value? Congress has declared that it cannot redeem its obligations, and yet they have offered to sell lawful legal tender silver dollars (at a premium) for its depreciated legal obligations called "Federal Reserve Notes." Does this "Act" make sense?

"The term, current bank paper, has a definite and legal significance. It certainly does not mean notes at a 50% discount and such as are bought and sold as merchandise."

Leiber v. Goodrich, Supra.;

Pierson v. Wallace, Supra.

Congress was actually purchasing Federal Reserve paper for "Lawful Money" and doing so at a discount of 3000% by the San Francisco Mint sale of lawful silver dollars.

"The dollar is the money unit of the United States."

5 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, 854

"Money, in a strictly technical sense, is coined metal, usually gold or silver, upon which the government stamp has been impressed to indicate its value. In its more popular sense, any currency, token bank note, or other circulating medium in general use is the representative of value."

Cook v. State,

130 Ark. 95;

15 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, 701

"The "Dollar" means lawful money of the United States."

103 US 792

The lawful money of the United States is gold and silver coin stamped by the sovereign power.

""Currency" means any form of paper money of the United States and implies genuineness and par value."

110 US 421; 25 Ark. 215;

83 Ala. 51; 23 Ind. 21;

35 Ill. 158; 8 Minn. 324;

27 Mich. 191

"Notes" in general; whether they are "United States Notes," "Federal Reserve Notes," or "Private Notes," imply an obligation.

"[Their] name imports obligation every one of them expresses upon its face in engagement of the nation to pay to the bearer a certain sum. The dollar note is an engagement to pay a dollar, and the dollar intended is the coined dollar of the United States..."

Bank of New York,

Supra at 30

Now comes a new era. Congress has repudiated its pledge and the "Notes" circulate merely by a lack of understanding as to what is money and what may pass as money. The people are so bogged down with debt to the banks that they haven't the time to question that debt to see if, in fact, it is a lawful debt that they owe.

The opinion in "Knox v. Lee" was that "Legal Tender Acts" do not attempt to make paper a standard of value nor did the Court assert that Congress may make anything which has no value, money.

Where then does Congress have the authority to declare that these worthless "Notes" are to be equal to money?

The "Act" of Congress, in creating a worthless tender, does no less than take the property of the people and give it to the banks without giving any consideration in return.

The legal tender cases merely established precedent for the government to enact by legislation ("Legal Tender Acts") that its promises to pay money shall be, for the time being, equivalent in value to the representative of value determined by the "Coinage Acts."

There is no longer an attempt, pledge, or intention, by Congress, or any Federal Reserve Bank, to redeem these "Notes" and consequently; no authority precedent or ability of Congress exists to enact legislation that these "Notes" are to be a legal tender.

"It may well be doubted whether the nature of society and of governments does not prescribe some limits to the legislative power; and if any be prescribed, where are they to be found if the property of an individual fairly and honestly acquired may be seized without compensation?"

Fletcher v. Peck,

6 Cranch 87, 3 L.Ed. 162

"It must be remembered that the Constitution is the fundamental law of the United States; by it, the people have created a government, defined its powers, prescribed their limits, distributed them [to] the different departments and directed in general the manner of their exercise. No department of the government has any other powers than those thus delegated to it by the people. All legislative power granted by the Constitution belongs to Congress; but it has no legislative powers which is not thus granted."

Hepburn v. Griswald,

Supra., 611

"Indeed, it may not improperly be said that the Federal Constitution is the government of the United States, though in common parlance we apply that term to administration. It was the Constitution that the convention formed and the people ordained for their government. The Constitution provided for installing temporary administrations to administer, to execute the provisions of the Constitution, but it constituted no body of men as the government, it provided for placing men temporarily in office to execute the powers specified in the Constitution, and nothing more. The very preamble to the Constitution declares this...

This Constitution, then, is in fact, the government created by our fathers, and when it dies, that government expires. And officers that carry on a government independent of a Constitution, constitute but a de facto government of assumed and unlimited powers."

Thayer v. Hedges,

22 Ind. 296

The power to coin money is one power, and the power to declare any Thing a legal tender is another and different power both possessed by the states severally at the adoption of the Constitution; that by that adoption the power to coin money was delegated to the Federal government while the power to declare a legal tender was not, but was retained by the states with a limitation, thus: "Congress should have power to coin money," and "No state shall make anything but gold and silver coin a legal tender." States then though they could not coin money, could declare that gold or silver coin, or both whether coined by the Federal Government or the Spanish or Mexican Governments, could be a legal tender. And as Congress was authorized to make money only of coin and the states were forbidden to make any Thing but coin a legal tender, a specie currency was secured in both Federal and State governments, there was then no need of delegating to Congress the power of declaring a legal tender in transactions within the domain of the Federal Legislation the money coined by it was the necessary medium.

The words "to coin money" regulate the value thereof and "of foreign coin" do not include the right to make coined money out of paper, if they could be so interpreted then the states must have a right to make such paper a legal tender be incidental to any granted power, could it be a necessary and proper incident for carrying such power into effect.

Not every act of Congress is to be regarded as the Supreme Law of the Land; not is it by every act of Congress that he Judges are bound."

Hepburn v. Griswald,

Supra., 611

We know that the paper itself has no value other than the value it achieves by the pledge of the United States to pay one dollar. Once that pledge is removed, the paper then no longer represents value; it is no longer representing the dollar. This "pledge" of redemption was officially removed on October 28, 1977 with Public Law 95-147 (91 Stat. 1229) at subsection (c):

"(c) The joint resolution entitled "Joint resolution to assure uniform value to the coins and currencies of the United States," approved June 5, 1933 (31 USC 463), shall not apply to obligations issued on or after the date of enactment of this section."

Congress may have declared that the payment in Currency, dollar for dollar in any Currency, is legal tender payment for debts; but Congress has not, and in fact Congress could not, declare that receiving of payment in any Currency constitutes a payment for debts in dollars.

It can not be permitted that a government ordained to establish justice can continually repudiate its obligations.

When the government withdraws its pledge, it must necessarily exempt its obligations from all forms of taxation.

The "Federal Reserve Note," being at best the evidence of an imposed tax, is exempt from all further taxation.

That "Note" or "tax receipt" does not constitute "income" but actually constitutes the giving of goods and serves labor and commodities without compensation.

Dissenting opinion of Justice Field, Julliard v. Greenman, 110 US 421

The wise Justice foresaw what is happening today; let us expand upon his theory. If Congress, by the means of a printing press, can print all the money it needs for any imaginary scheme, and it has in fact evolved to a time in the history of the United States when it can make something of value out of nothing; then any political body, who uses this Colonial system of taxation, can no longer justify taxing its Citizens by means of the socialistic tax on bankers' paper. The mere printing of the paper with unlimited restraint would serve as a new form of tax. The continuation by Congress to tax its Citizens in any other manner, when it professes to have this ability, is nothing less than plunder in the form of unlawful confiscation of private property to unlawfully pay the unnecessary interest on an unnecessary government debt because of the purported delegation of creating demand deposit "money" to bankers under the fractional-reserve "National Bank Act" and the "Federal Reserve Act."